



A water tank, filled with 10,000 litres of clean fresh water is installed in Maribi, Leyte (December 2013). Anne Wright/Oxfam

TYPHOON HAIYAN

The response so far and vital lessons for the Philippines recovery

Typhoon Haiyan not only killed thousands and made millions homeless. It also struck an already poor region, pushing families deeper into poverty, and making them more vulnerable to the next disaster.

Governments and individuals have acted generously. Despite serious challenges, the aid response is now expanding. But crucial gaps must still be urgently addressed.

And as the long road to recovery begins, the Philippines authorities and the world must increase efforts to tackle poverty, and to reduce the growing risk of climate-related disasters that the Philippines and other countries will face.

1 INTRODUCTION

On 8 November 2013, Haiyan (known locally as Yolanda) became the strongest typhoon to make landfall ever recorded. It was accompanied by a storm surge that smashed through coastal neighbourhoods and farmlands across much of the central Philippines.

Preparations and early warnings saved many lives. But, despite that, thousands died and millions were left in need of urgent assistance. Local officials and emergency response teams were themselves initially shaken, as swamps of seawater and jungles of debris created a logistical nightmare for survivors and those trying to assist them.

In spite of the extraordinary challenges, a massive relief effort has done well to help millions of people survive and recover. But it needs to expand fast to reach communities, especially in remote rural areas, that have struggled to receive official aid.

Yet the repercussions of Typhoon Haiyan go beyond the initial destruction. It has also pushed millions of poor people into deepening debt and destitution – making them even more exposed to the next disaster.

One month on, national and international support must continue to help families survive now and help them rebuild more resilient communities for years to come – years in which the world will face many more frequent extreme weather events.

This paper challenges the world to remember the Philippines long after the TV cameras have gone. It provides a snapshot of the humanitarian response's initial successes and struggles. More importantly, it then sums up the challenges that the Philippines and the international community now face: to fill the gaps in the immediate response; on the long road to recovery from Haiyan; and to plan for and cope with the future disasters (partly driven by climate change) that will hit hazard-prone communities in many countries in the future.

We thought it was like any ordinary strong typhoon where you just sleep, stay indoors and eat. This was different.

Thelma, a survivor sheltering in Panalaron Elementary School, November 2013

I'm here helping to organize distribution of hygiene and water kits. I've also received a hygiene kit. I cried when I opened the bag. There were so many items. So many things we all need. I've shared some of the items with a woman from another barangay. I was really happy to share because their need was greater than mine.

Vergie Ochia, Bantayan Island, November 2013

Box 1: Oxfam's response in brief

- By 2 December, almost 250,000 women, men, and children had received assistance – restoring water supplies, providing clean water and sanitation facilities and items (such as hygiene kits), helping to restore farming and other livelihoods, and food assistance;
- Current plans are to assist approximately 500,000 people in the Eastern and Central Visayas regions within four months.

MapAction OCHA
Philippines: Typhoon Yolanda - Severity Ranking (as at 30 Nov 2013)

Severity score was generated from a multivariate formula incorporating physical factors (est storm surge, proximity to storm path, etc) reported affected population stats and baseline vulnerability indicators. Data originally compiled by Miguel Antonio Garcia from the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics and then geo-referenced by UN-OCHA, MSF-UK, and WFP.

Ranked Severity

- Most severe municipalities
- Least severe municipalities
- Not ranked
- ⊠ OSOCC
- ⊠ Sub OSOCC
- ⊠ Logistics
- - - Storm track


0 20 40 60 80 100
kilometres

Data sources
Severity scores: see above
Boundaries: GADM

Created: 02 Dec 2013 / 12:00 UTC+08:00
Map Document: MA1001_SeverityRanking
Projection / Datum: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 51N
GéId Number: TC-2013-000139-PHL

The depiction and use of boundaries, names and associated data shown

Produced by **MapAction** Supported by **UKaid**
www.mapaction.org



2 PROGRESS AND GAPS IN THE RESPONSE

As Haiyan approached the Philippines, approximately 800,000 people were evacuated and disaster response personnel and equipment were quickly deployed. Such immediate action by the authorities, aid agencies and local responders helped save many lives and facilitated the subsequent relief effort.

Nonetheless, more than 5,600 were killed, over 1,700 people remain missing, and the destruction to homes and infrastructure has been immense. Haiyan was the strongest typhoon to make landfall ever recorded, with wind speeds of 315 kph (195 mph). The accompanying storm surge sent a wave up to five metres high smashing through coastal communities, killing many who thought they were safe.¹ This was a phenomenon that many people did not fully understand and the precise threat from the surge was not communicated by the authorities effectively.

A huge national and international relief effort has supported the immediate local response. The Philippines government, backed by generous and effective support from the international community, has been energetic in its leadership and co-ordination of a huge and complex response. And it has been backed by generous and effective support from the international community which, to some extent, has improved its co-ordination significantly since slow responses in Darfur and elsewhere kick-started a series of humanitarian reforms ten years ago.

No humanitarian response to a disaster of this scale will be perfect, and this was no exception. Extreme logistical challenges often hindered and delayed the relief, but by 1 December:²

- An estimated three million people had received food assistance including rice, high energy biscuits and emergency food items;
- More than 35,000 households had received tarpaulin sheets or tents (particularly in Eastern Samar and Leyte provinces) with efforts to reach another 478,000 households under way; and
- About 80 per cent of people still in Tacloban City had access to clean water and about 60,000 hygiene kits had been distributed.

This and other aid – including health care, services to protect children, and cash transfers – have helped keep families alive, prevented outbreaks of disease, and begun to help people to rebuild their lives. In the context of Haiyan's severity and the logistical challenges it created, these are notable successes.

Many storms have passed here. But we did not expect a storm that brought a 'tsunami' with it. We only know of rain and wind. We did not expect the sea would devour the land.

Mother of two in fishing community, November 2013

URGENT CONCERNS

Despite the above, millions of people have still received little or no official aid. Greater efforts are needed to ensure all affected families receive enough now and to help devastated communities rebuild their homes, infrastructure and livelihoods in ways that leave them better equipped to withstand the next disaster.

Priority needs

Box 2: Haiyan numbers at a glance (3 December 2013)³

- Almost 15 million people affected;
- At least 5,600 killed and over 26,200 injured;
- Over four million still displaced from their homes;
- 1.2 million homes damaged or destroyed;
- \$348m requested by the current UN six-month Haiyan Action Plan.

Nearly three million men, women and children are still relying on some form of **food assistance**. An Oxfam assessment in northwest Leyte at the end of November found that in some remote rural areas, communities had nothing to eat except the food aid they received. Distribution of food items in these areas is still a vital lifeline, though it must be done in a way that is co-ordinated so as not to disrupt markets or the local production of food. Where markets have been revived, particularly in urban centres, cash assistance has helped families to buy food, and local traders to recover.

A UN assessment of nine municipalities in Leyte at the end of November reported that 'food appears to be effectively distributed in some [areas], but not effectively or evenly distributed in others ... the more remote communities are not notified adequately or are required to walk in for what remains available.'⁴

More than 579,000 houses have been totally destroyed, making over **four million people homeless**. Some have returned to build makeshift shelters, while others continue to leave the worst-hit areas. For many, the **lack of affordable shelter and construction materials** delays their return; in some places, building materials have doubled in price. Oxfam's assessment in northwest Leyte found that the distribution of emergency shelter kits had met less than 10 per cent of total needs in most surveyed municipalities.

Reviving livelihoods quickly is essential to prevent deepening debt and destitution, and to stimulate the recovery. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that up to one million farmers and fisher folk were affected by the disaster.

An urgent priority are the tens of thousands of poor rice farmers who need to replace lost seeds and tools as well as damaged storage and irrigation facilities in time to plant in December and early January. This is vital to ensure a productive rice harvest in March and April 2014.

Other vital priorities are fishing communities, who report losing on average two-thirds of their fishing equipment, and the 2.8 million people employed in service-related jobs that have now disappeared, many of whom are women. Indeed, though women do not have equal access to land, nor other assets, or equal participation in the rural labour force, they have many skills – including high levels of education and a significant presence in trade and small and medium-sized enterprises – that should be used in any equitable and effective recovery.

The continued restoration of **clean water supplies** and access to safe sanitation facilities is vital to minimize the risk of disease. **Sanitation facilities** at overcrowded evacuation centres have generally been overwhelmed. Twenty-two of Tacloban's evacuation centres reported inadequate drainage and waste management facilities after two weeks, as well as a lack of electricity. Oxfam's assessment in northwest Leyte found a surge in cases of acute diarrhoea owing to damaged and contaminated water supplies and a severe lack of sanitation facilities.

As foreign medical teams specializing in trauma injuries begin to leave, and existing health facilities remain overstretched, **gaps in health care** are inevitable (including the treatment of wounds, acute respiratory infections and chronic conditions such as diabetes), unless the government accelerates the expansion of such services.

A wider problem is the degree to which **levels of assistance vary** depending on location. Many relief distributions have been limited to people registered in evacuation centres, with registration linked to official voter lists, to the disadvantage of displaced families living outside them. Relief operations largely began in urban areas and then spread slowly into adjoining districts and beyond, but the limited number of heavy vehicles and warehouse facilities in hubs such as Tacloban has delayed distributions.

The lack of debris clearing equipment also means that many rural communities remain inaccessible and have seen little aid distribution. For example, many villages in Eastern Samar received no outside assistance in the first three weeks, including vulnerable indigenous communities. Remote rural communities have relied on local charitable initiatives, including donations organized by individual benefactors, businesses and churches.

Mass displacement in overcrowded conditions has also raised **risks to the safety and well being of vulnerable groups, such as women and children**. Experience of past disasters in the Philippines (and elsewhere) suggests that rates of gender-based violence, sexual exploitation, abuse and trafficking are likely to rise. A lack of female police officers, the scarcity of women-only spaces in evacuation centres, and disrupted maternal and reproductive health services have made the challenge of reducing the risks to vulnerable groups that much harder.

The mayor had called an emergency meeting and instructed all the officials and health workers to tell the community to evacuate to the barangay hall, the school, the church and other places. They soon became full and many people couldn't get in and we had to find other places for people to go.

Vergie Ochia, Bantayan Island, November 2013

PERFORMANCE SO FAR

Following the overview of priority needs, the rest of this section outlines the performance of different actors since 8 November, beginning with the Philippines authorities.

National and local government

The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council is the spine of disaster management in the Philippines, running from national to municipal levels, with government ministries, the armed forces, emergency services and civil society all represented. Its structure designates four cabinet ministers as leads for different aspects of the disaster management cycle: Preparedness, Response, Prevention and Mitigation, and Rehabilitation and Recovery.

When Typhoon Haiyan struck, several ministers were dispatched to oversee relief operations or aspects of the response, and a task force began drafting an action plan for assistance, recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Despite this commendable energy, there was initially no clear leader for the whole response. In this regard, the appointment on 2 December of former senator Panfilo Lacson to head rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts was a positive step.

At first local government in many places was overwhelmed by the disaster. As it began to respond, some neighbourhood officials claimed that delays in aid to their communities were due to municipal authorities prioritizing other districts for political reasons. Such perceptions must be overcome by accelerating aid to all areas, and, for example, by posting distribution dates on websites and public notice boards to make them more transparent.

International support

All member states of ASEAN, including Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar, responded to the humanitarian needs. Beyond the South East Asian region, the world's immediate response to Haiyan has been generous – certainly when compared to the numerous other humanitarian crises that struggle for international attention. Within the first three weeks of the response, \$391m in humanitarian assistance was given, with the largest contributions from the UK, the US, Japan, Australia, Canada, Sweden, the United Arab Emirates, the Netherlands and Saudi Arabia.⁵

According to Oxfam's initial analysis, many countries have given far more than their 'fair share' of the total (relative to their Gross National Income) – not only large bilateral donors such as the UK, Australia, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands, but also countries such as Denmark, New Zealand and Luxembourg.⁷ Beyond the 'traditional' donors, substantial amounts have also been given by Persian Gulf countries and by multilateral organizations such as the Asian Development Bank and European Commission, as well as by countless private individuals all over the world.

While international donors have been swift to respond to the Philippines disaster, that and sufficient humanitarian aid elsewhere is the real test of global decency as 2013 draws to an end.

Mark Goldring, Chief Executive,
Oxfam GB, November 2013⁶

Just ahead of a new UN appeal on 9 December, the challenge to these donors and others is to sustain this generosity as long as the people of the Philippines need it, and to make sure that it comes in addition to, not instead of, adequate funding for other humanitarian crises, such as those in Syria and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is worth noting that international attention has only fallen on some disasters in the Philippines; the UN appeal in response to another disaster, the Bohol earthquake, is only 21 per cent funded after nearly two months.⁸

UN agencies

The UN designated its Haiyan disaster response an L3 – its highest classification. A UN emergency response team reached Tacloban within 12 hours of Haiyan striking land, and the response has clearly benefited from the senior UN personnel deployed to co-ordinate the various aid sectors (known as ‘clusters’). The clusters for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) and Protection (including child protection) are among those that have performed well, with effective leadership and experienced personnel. The UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has also displayed agility and effectiveness. However, some UN agencies faced difficulties in mobilizing quickly and initially struggled to overcome logistical challenges, such as procuring vehicles, although this noticeably improved after two weeks.

Local, national and international NGOs

Many NGOs, including women’s organizations and local community groups, have been at the frontline of the response. Local charities and volunteer groups helped keep poor families alive in the days immediately following the typhoon.

With airports, seaports, roads and bridges rendered unusable, many aid organizations (including Oxfam) initially struggled to deliver large amounts of aid quickly. Procuring sufficient vehicles has been a critical challenge although a few international organizations – such as ACTED and the International Organization for Migration – were able to obtain cars and lent these to others. One noteworthy contribution came from the US-based Fuel for Relief Fund, which arrived in Tacloban with \$100,000-worth of fuel and gave amounts free to any organization involved in relief operations.

Despite the above challenges, Oxfam itself has assisted almost 250,000 people, with plans to double that figure within four months (see Box 1). Oxfam plans to publish lessons learned from the difficulties it experienced and encourages others to do so as well.

It is important that all international agencies – NGOs and UN alike – work closely with the Philippines authorities and civil society groups to ensure their activities form part of a sustainable recovery and to help strengthen their long-term capacity. Oxfam, for example, has helped restore water supplies in Tacloban for 80,000 people, in collaboration with both the Leyte Metropolitan Water Department and A Single Drop of Safe Water, a Philippines NGO that Oxfam had been working with before the disaster.

Private Sector

From small businesses to multinational corporations, the private sector has played a significant role in the disaster response; raising funds, providing support services and delivering aid. Philippines companies are reported to have contributed over \$45m in funds, goods and personnel.⁹ Foreign businesses have added more funds and contributions in-kind, as well as innovative assistance such as two surveillance drones – from Danish technology firm Danoffice IT – with photographic, video and thermal imaging capabilities that can fly over streets blocked by debris.

The private sector can now build on its positive role by participating in reconstruction efforts that support equitable economic regeneration.

3 REBUILDING SAFER COMMUNITIES

The Philippines is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world, experiencing an average of 20 typhoons per year.

The Philippines authorities have invested significantly in disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation (CCA). Central budget allocations for DRR amounted to \$624m in 2011 – two per cent of the national budget and 0.28 per cent of GDP – while at least five per cent of a local authority's revenue is set aside for its Local Disaster Risk Reduction Management Fund.¹¹

The government enacted the Climate Change Act (2009) and the National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Act (2010), and DRR and CCA are cross-cutting concerns across economic policies, social development and the environment in the Philippine Development Plan 2011–2016. An Overseas Development Institute study (conducted before Typhoon Haiyan) rated the Philippines highly for its capacity to adapt to climate change and found that the Philippines had a 'better than average disaster risk management and adaptive capacity with a good chance of minimizing long-term disaster impacts now and in the future.'¹²

The efforts of the Philippines authorities – including early warnings that triggered mass evacuations – helped save many lives and limit losses from Haiyan. For example, all 500 houses on the low-lying island of Tulang Diyot east of Cebu, were destroyed by the typhoon and storm surge. Yet, thanks to prompt evacuation, all residents survived. Such actions resulted in a lower death toll than might have been expected given Haiyan's severity; and altogether the loss of life, though terrible, was less than the scale of physical destruction might have suggested.

Investments in DRR have made a difference and should now be stepped up with renewed vigour – in the Philippines and around the world. Lessons from the Philippines (including the benefits of effective early warnings and evacuations) should be accompanied by learning from other countries – such as the success of cyclone shelters in Bangladesh.

But, in light of the extraordinary risks the Philippines faces from disasters, it will need extraordinary levels of DRR and CCA investment for decades to come. Donor financing for DRR in the Philippines makes it the fourth largest recipient of such aid in the world. But, over the past 20 years, that has still only been \$10.78 per capita. In those terms, this rates as 32nd, not 4th, in the world.¹³

In short, international donors have given the Philippines too little to support its DRR – in the light of the risks and the numbers of people potentially exposed to them. International investment in DRR in the Philippines should be substantially increased – and with a greater emphasis on tackling the poverty that makes many people more vulnerable.

It will not be enough to build people's lives and communities to where they were before the disaster; we need to rebuild communities with the confidence that we are not rebuilding the risks again. We need to ensure that reconstruction of homes and infrastructure will be in safer ground following sound construction standards.

Senator Loren Legarda, DRR champion and author of the Philippines' Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Law¹⁰

POVERTY AND INEQUALITY

However, DRR by itself will not be enough. The heavily affected Eastern Visayas region was already the third poorest in the Philippines, blighted by weak infrastructure and struggling agricultural and fishing sectors. A third of homes in Tacloban only had wooden walls. Almost two million people earned less than \$2 per day,¹⁴ with many rural women the poorest of all – despite the fact that the Philippines has reduced inequalities between men and women, according to one global report, more than any other country in Asia.¹⁵

This poverty was predominantly rural although with increasing numbers of poor people in urban areas as well. It was most widespread among farmers (46 per cent of whom were poor) and fishing communities (45 per cent),¹⁶ and was crucially linked to the lack of access to land. Among the 16,300 coconut farmers in Eastern Samar, more than half have no secure access to land. The Philippines government has been enacting plans to distribute land to poor farmers, but distribution rates in the Eastern Visayas region are the lowest nationwide, and are particularly dismal for coconut farmers.¹⁷

Reasons for poverty among farmers and fisher folk include: the low prices for producers set by big traders; weakly enforced laws (such as those preventing companies fishing in municipal waters reserved for small-scale fisher folk); environmental degradation (such as loss of mangroves, which serve both as ecosystems for marine life and physical defences against tides and storm surges); and poor rural infrastructure.

While international demand for coconut has increased, the benefits have not trickled down to poor coconut farmers because they have no means to process and add value to any part of their raw product. Rice traders often set market prices that exploit small producers, while lending money to them at high interest.

Workers in service jobs – often women – are forced to work for low incomes because of informal terms of employment that offered little protection or benefits. Indeed, gender inequality in access to land and other resources, and in participation in the workforce, has made rural women the poorest of the poor in Eastern Visayas.

BREAKING THE CYCLE OF DISASTER AND POVERTY

Though Haiyan was exceptional, this vicious cycle of disaster and poverty is not. Studies conducted after Tropical Storm Ondoy and Typhoon Pepeng hit the Philippines in 2009 pointed to disproportionate impacts on poor people and a subsequent increase in poverty.¹⁸

Any post-Haiyan reconstruction plan must help to break this cycle by diversifying livelihoods, increasing secure land tenure, relocating people living in high-risk areas, and ensuring local institutions and services are

What I need now is to start earning a little cash so that I can buy food, school my children and start rebuilding my house ... I don't know how long it will take for us to start living normally, maybe in two years time. My income is normally very low and so we will recover very slowly, just a little at a time.

Victor Villarmel, Silion,
Bantayan Island, November
2013

better equipped to respond to disasters. Resources for reconstruction (from domestic sources and international aid) must prioritize the poor communities that need them most – rather than areas or social groups that may be politically or economically more influential. That, in turn, demands transparency in how reconstruction funds are spent and in how contracts are awarded for relevant projects, including the vast infrastructural repairs that will be necessary. It will also require the active involvement of independent media and civil society watchdogs to ensure this happens.

WARNING FOR THE WORLD

Disaster risk is on the rise. One key driver of that is climate change. While recognizing the challenges in modelling typhoons, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has suggested that, though the number of tropical cyclones is unlikely to increase, climate change is likely to increase the intensity of typhoons in the region.¹⁹ However, we know with more certainty that projected sea level rises will compound the effects of any storm surge;²⁰ elevated sea levels around the Philippines are likely to have significantly increased the height of Haiyan's deadly storm surge.²¹ The disaster on 8 November fits a pattern at least of generally rising risks of extreme-weather events.

At the same time, more people are becoming exposed to hazards like typhoons through population growth and migration – not in and of themselves, but when accompanied by poor development and planning. This has led to many more poor people forced to live in vulnerable areas, especially cities where the risks of disasters is increased through high population density, inadequate urban planning, and poor infrastructure.

In the Philippines, for instance, annual population growth rate stands at 1.9 per cent – one of the highest in Asia.²² The urban population is 49 per cent of the total, set to rise to 65 per cent by 2030.²³ The population of Tacloban nearly tripled from about 76,000 to 221,000 in the past 40 years.

Ultimately, even a country's best effort to adapt to climate change and scale-up DRR may not be enough to mitigate the destruction caused by extreme climate events. That is why the recent UN Climate Summit in Warsaw, COP19, announced an International Mechanism on Loss and Damage to help countries manage climate-related damages that occur despite a country's effort to adapt. Haiyan highlights the need for such a mechanism, the details of which must now be agreed by governments and may include risk transfer programmes, such as insurance, and rehabilitation and compensation for loss of livelihoods, property and territory.

4 CONCLUSIONS

Backed by international support that has been more generous and effective than in many other crises, and led by active Philippines authorities, the humanitarian response has assisted millions of people. But much more needs to be done to expand the post-Haiyan relief effort and ensure everyone who needs assistance gets it.

Haiyan brutally exposed limitations in the longstanding efforts to prepare the Philippines for natural hazards such as typhoons. Previous investments in disaster risk reduction, preparations and evacuations certainly saved lives. But to meet the growing threat of disasters, made worse by climate change, much more needs to be done on four fronts.

First, local authorities, services and civil society organizations at the frontline of any disaster response must be better equipped to deal with future shocks.

Second, an adequately resourced and sustained reconstruction strategy should spearhead an economic regeneration of the disaster zone. That strategy must target the most vulnerable people. It should reduce the poverty and inequalities that trap them in a cycle of disaster, debt and destitution. And it should make use of the skills of local people, including women and their organizations, to help make the recovery both effective and just.

Third, the Philippines authorities and international donors should build on past efforts to reduce disaster risks by significantly scaling up investments in DRR and CCA to a level commensurate with the scale and rise in risks, and the number of people exposed to them.

And fourth, record-breaking storms, such as Typhoon Haiyan show that the most powerful storms will inevitably cause massive destruction – even if every other step is taken. The need for international agreements to cut the carbon emissions that fuel global warming and extreme weather events is therefore far beyond urgent.

RECOMMENDATIONS

One month after Haiyan, the following are just the beginning of what must be done.

Backed by the international community, the Philippines government should:

- **Accelerate and expand relief operations in all areas of the disaster zone.** These should prioritize: increased distributions of food assistance (cash, vouchers, in-kind food); improved water supplies and sanitation facilities; greater cash support for very poor and vulnerable groups and for the early recovery of livelihoods; and support for emergency and transitional shelter (with measures to stabilize building material prices) including for tenants. Such a response focusing on vulnerable groups will require collecting and effectively using data that disaggregates needs by gender.
- **Ensure that services to protect vulnerable groups, such as women and children, are rapidly expanded.** These should include access to trained protection staff and domestic violence telephone hotlines; increased deployment of female police; and women-friendly spaces in displaced communities. All of which should be supported as a crucial part of the crisis response and not as a secondary issue (alongside of course measures to ensure 'safe programming', so that no part of the response increases risks for women, girls or other vulnerable groups).
- **Create a stronger and more empowered national disaster risk reduction and management body that goes beyond coordination,** to strengthen the disaster risk reduction and response abilities of authorities, emergency services, and civil society organizations at provincial and district levels. This should include greater local access to financial resources and equipment in order to strengthen local disaster risk reduction and response.
- **Deliver a pro-poor reconstruction strategy that spearheads a major economic development of the worst affected regions and tackles inequalities, including of gender, that make people vulnerable.** The strategy should involve communities (including women's groups) in their design and implementation, incentivize low-carbon private sector investment, and involve mechanisms for transparency and accountability of all aid and investments.
- **Build on past investments in DRR and CCA nationally with a greater emphasis on reducing poverty and inequality.** This should include adequate funding of the mandated National DRRM fund and the People's Survival Fund. Additionally, lessons such as those relating to effective early warnings, environmental protection and cyclone shelters should be applied and implemented on a substantially wider scale.

International donors should:

- **Fully fund the revised Haiyan Action Plan co-ordinated by the UN, and adequately support (through DRR and CCA funds as appropriate) an inclusive reconstruction strategy** which helps strengthen national and local government institutions to manage the recovery, and supports local civil society, including women's organizations in that process.
- **Support to the Philippines in strengthening its DRR strategy** with increased emphasis and investment to reduce the poverty and socio-economic inequality that increase people's vulnerability to future disasters.
- **Increase DRR funding to at least one per cent of international development aid budgets** in line with global standards.
- **Scale up public financing for climate change adaptation and mitigation in developing countries** to meet the agreed \$100bn per year target for climate finance by 2020.

The UN and international NGOs should:

- **Continue to increase support to the Philippines government and state institutions, as well as civil society organizations**, in order to accelerate the response and ensure sustainability of the recovery and reconstruction efforts. International actors should integrate their activities with those of domestic actors, avoiding the establishment of parallel service provision and uncoordinated investments.
- **Strengthen gender analysis across all programmes and implement projects accountably** and on the basis of the needs and priorities of different groups. This should include actively supporting women's leadership and women's organizations, and looking for other opportunities to ensure that relief and recovery programmes help to promote gender equality in the long-term.

NOTES

- ¹ A tragic example of this occurred at the Tacloban City Convention Centre, which was serving as an evacuation site sheltering hundreds of families from ferocious winds. However, the storm surge completely submerged the ground floor, killing dozens of people.
- ² Data from UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2013) 'Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan Situation Report No. 20 (as of 3 December 2013', <http://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/philippines-typhoon-haiyan-situation-report-no-20-3-december-2013>
- ³ Data from UN OCHA and National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC); the figure for the total number of people affected is from the Philippines Department for Social Welfare and Development.
- ⁴ UN OCHA (2013) 'Typhoon Haiyan [Yolanda] Rapid Needs Assessment Report: 9 Municipalities in Leyte Province 25-30 November 2013,' p. 5, http://mhpps.net/wp-content/uploads/group-documents/219/1386012339-RapidAssessmentReport_NineMunicipalitiesinLeyteProvince.pdf.
- ⁵ This includes amounts that the UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service classified as 'committed' or 'contributed' as of 29 November 2013, three weeks after the typhoon, <http://fts.unocha.org/pagelader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&appealID=1043>
- ⁶ M. Goldring (2013) 'Learning Lessons in the Philippines', Huffington Post, 18 November, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/mark-goldring/philippines-typhoon-haiyan_b_4295070.html
- ⁷ The fair share analysis is of members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and uses the aggregate amount of the United Nations and International Red Cross and Red Crescent appeals as a proxy for the total funding required and is calculated on the basis that members of the DAC will in aggregate provide 60% of the total funding required and that the fair share of individual DAC members is equal to the proportion the gross national income (GNI) of a DAC member is to the aggregate GNI of all DAC members. The analysis is of funds contributed or committed to the UN appeal and outside it, but excludes non-binding pledges. Funding by the European Commission's Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and the United Nations Central Emergency Fund (CERF) is allocated to DAC members by reference to their contributions to ECHO and CERF. The funding data in the analysis is from the Financial Tracking Service managed by the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on 29 November 2013.
- ⁸ As of 4 December 2013, according to UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service, http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R1_A1041_1312040300.pdf
- ⁹ Business Civic Leadership Center, 'Typhoon Haiyan – Corporate Aid Tracker', <http://bclc.uschamber.com/site-page/typhoon-haiyan-corporate-aid-tracker>
- ¹⁰ A. McElroy (2013) 'Senator urges 'don't rebuild risks again'', <https://www.unisdr.org/archive/35487>
- ¹¹ S. Jose (2012) 'Preliminary Examination of Existing Methodologies for Allocating and Tracking National Government Budget for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in the Philippines', UNISDR, pg 24, http://www.unisdr.org/files/32378_32378philippinesdraftinvestmentt.pdf
- ¹² A. Shepherd et al (2013) 'Geography of Poverty, Disasters and Climate Extremes in 2030', ODI, <http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/7491-geography-poverty-disasters-climate-change-2030>
- ¹³ J. Kellett and A. Caravani (2013) 'Financing Disaster Risk Reduction: A 20 year story of international aid', ODI, <http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/7452-climate-finance-disaster-risk-reduction>
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For further information on the issues raised in this paper please e-mail advocacy@oxfaminternational.org

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